I think you get the biggest advantage from BitLocker when you use TPM (PCR 7+11) with a PIN. That should mitigate the exploit because the FVEK should never be read without the PIN, and if BitLocker does it right (which I think it does) too many wrong PIN's results in the TPM going into dictionary attack lockout mode.<p>Now I've been trying for months to do the same for Linux. There's systemd-cryptsetup/cryptenroll, but it's only for LUKS and I'm trying to encrypt a few sensitive directories on a super slow internal eMMC with fscrypt (keys for secure boot and /home). The TPM is _EXTREMELY_ hard to code for when things go beyond the basics:<p>1. Bind to PCR 7<p>2. Bind to changing PCR 11 (changes whenever the kernel, init, cmdline etc. is updated)<p>3. Use a PIN - but not the AuthValue, because I want to use the same authorization policy for resetting the DA lockout counter on login, and also have a long password/AuthValue for resetting the counter manually.<p>4. Make it all work with PCR 11 signatures and public keys provided by systemd-stub.<p>Maybe this isn't the right place to ask, but there's almost nothing but basic TPM guides out there, so if you're an expert I could really use your help. It's just for a personal project, but I'll write about it once I'm done - if I ever figure it out!