Honestly I think this article is ok, but it tries way, way to hard to explain 1933 based on this. The events of the Post-W1 are interesting enough without only evaluating it in context of 1933. And sure, they had something to do with 1933, but so did WW1 and many other things.<p>The reality that still many people don't want to see is that the deal was actually not bad for German. Keynes as usually got it totally wrong. They could paid the reparations, other countries have done so in arguable worse situations. Germany was mostly untouched by WW1 (capital stock), they had significant industrial power and very good relations with the US. Massive amounts of investment went into the country, more then after WW2 and the Marshall Plan.<p>They always received far more money in foreign investment then they ever had to pay back, and then over multiple rounds, that debt was reduced and reduced and then eliminated. Mostly because US and British elites had no interest in actually enforcing anything. Essentially stabbing France in the back.<p>The route cause of all of this is really Wilson. Wilson refused to ally himself to Britain and France. He always was pro-German, or at very least saw them as one and the same. Then he fell right into the traps of the German, when the Germans came to him specifically, over heads of France and Britain, and ask for an armistice on lenient terms. And then the Germans could let Wilson do the work of forcing this deal onto Britain and France. Instead of insisting that armistice negotiations would only be held with all major nations together.<p>Henry Cabot Lodge and other in congress (and of course many others) believed pushing at least into the Ruhr was the minimum. Then you can negotiate from a real position of strength and you can continue to occupy the Ruhr with a multinational (US/Belgium/English/French) force until Germany was clearly in line. And at the minimum they should destroyed German army leadership and split up all the large land holdings in the East of German. This would have actually benefited the SPD. But the SPD couldn't really do it themselves. And this is not hing sight, many at the time understood this.<p>Then during the negotiations he continued to refused the US/Britain/French alliance that could have stabilized the world. He refused unilateral debt renegotiation with his allies. Both of these were done successfully after WW2.<p>He only cared about the flawed 'League of Nations'. And the reason he actually wanted the 'League of Nations' is because it would have overruled the constitution and would have given him power to go to war without congress. So if Serbia attacks Greece, the US could go to war with Serbia without congress approval. Wilson really hated congress (or anything else that prevented him from doing whatever he wanted).<p>But France simply refused to go along with the deal Wilson had in mind. Because France was not dumb enough to believe that 'Collective Security' from the League would actually help them. This could only be overcome by Wilson basically caving in, and offering France the alliance it wanted. So the whole Treaty was concluded under what turned out to be false promises in the first place.<p>He then refused any attempt by congress to even minimally adjust the treaty, making it clear that the US would only go to war with an act of congress. Its often claimed that congress was full of hardcore isolationist but this simply isn't the case. Many republicans were pro allies, and wanted the US to take a leadership position in global affairs. Very basic congressional politics could resulted into the US joining the League and having an alliance with France and Britain. Many republicans would have gone along with that.<p>The problem is, he was so hell bent on his (flawed) vision of Collective Security and Presidential power. He wasted time and nearly killed himself giving speeches and trying to convince the general population of his vision. And then he eventually opposed the treaty in congress anyway because it wasn't exactly his, telling the democrats to vote against. This collapsed the complete security architecture of Europe and diplomatic fallout followed. Leading to a more isolationist mood in the US.<p>Germany saw the opportunity to do the same thing again, claiming they can't pay, creating inflation, divided US/French/British and again using to US to force the others into line. The US pushed for debt restructuring for German debt on French and Britain. But its important to understand, there was no restructuring of the debt that Britain and France owned the US. So the US was very willing and aggressively pushed for Germany to pay less debt to other, but was unwilling to reduce the debt on its own allies. Wilson had completely refused any consideration that all of the this debt was connected. He wanted to use debt as a mechanism to keep France and Britain in line instead.<p>The Treaty of Versailles was full to the brim with inspirational stuff, like womans rights, labor rights, pretty much anybody that showed up with some concerns could get bunch of stuff into the Treaty. But it fundamentally lacked solutions for the things that actually mattered to the leadership of all the countries, European security and government debt.<p>The fundamental division between US/France/Britain essentially gave Germany the opportunity to completely reverse the Treaty of Versailles and facing no consequences.<p>So I think saying the hyperinflation is the cause of 1933 is fundamentally flawed, its more accurate to say that both the hyperinflation, the great depression and the return of German militarism were all because of a flawed peace making after WW1. And Wilson wanting the US to stand alone, "city upon a hill" and all the others are just equally unimportant sinners that could be dominated by him is a the root of the issue. He negotiated an armistice on bad terms, forced a bad treaty onto the other nations and then failed to actually stand behind his treaty. So at the end of his presidency, the complete Post-WW1 security architecture had already fundamentally collapsed and the Treaty of Versailles was mostly a dead letter.<p>This comment is long enough, but the Great Depression very much happened because of this same dynamic.<p>I recommend Adam Tooze on some of this (even if I don't fully agree with him on some things). These talks he gave at Standford about the Post-WW1 treaties.<p>Making Peace in Europe 1917-1919: Brest-Litovsk and Versailles (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EDlRKl3XGoM" rel="nofollow">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EDlRKl3XGoM</a>)<p>Hegemony: Europe, America and the problem of financial reconstruction, 1916-1933 (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Alx_JDpQio" rel="nofollow">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Alx_JDpQio</a>)<p>And the book its based on: "The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931"