I think there are some issues with cryptpad, most significantly that documents which are shared via their share link (default way of sharing) will effectively be shared with Google, Apple, Microsoft, and so on. I think this is dangerous because some users may be under the impression that Cryptpad secures their documents from the prying of big tech's eyes, but since it's guaranteed that at least some document collaborators will be using those companies' browsers, and browser history is synced, the URLs (which contain the key to decrypt the document after the fragment) to any document which is shared with more than handful of cypherpunks will certainly end up shared with the main browser vendors<p>Additionally, they've failed to make some architectural and delivery decisions which would protect users from various attacks like a server compromise (for example, a server seized by an adversary may send malicious client code that conducts a document exfiltration), as well as document exfiltration via a malicious browser extension. Both of these can be mitigated somewhat by delivering the frontend as a desktop app or signed browser extension, and setting reasonable CSPs in the decryption modules. This is exactly the reason Signal doesn't offer a web app.<p>Cryptpad <i>does</i> offer the ability to additionally encrypt documents with shared passwords, and this offers a fair modicum of greater protection against document interception. But this isn't the default document mode, so I doubt most documents are password-protected in practice.<p>I did share all of the above with the Cryptpad team, and was told they don't intend to address the above issues, so I'd recommend against putting to much faith in them for the time being.