> <i>...these strong similarities are not what these authors choose to emphasize.</i><p>This statement feels misleading, in that the similarities do not appear to be as significant as they are implying. The table they provide very clearly shows a significant difference between their 2010 findings and the HAP paper (-0.1 vs. 2.2 mean, a gap of over 2 percentage points).<p>> <i>These results are, in fact, of a similar order of magnitude to the detailed country by country results we present in table 1 of the AER paper</i><p>Taken literally, this makes no sense. No one has ever claimed the HAP results were of a differing <i>order of magnitude</i> to their own.<p>Given that this is a rebuttal to a research paper where numerical values are in dispute, I would have thought they would use the term ("order of magnitude") precisely, and not colloquially.<p>> <i>It is utterly misleading to speak of a 1% growth differential that lasts 10-25 years as small.</i><p>Perhaps, but if a 1% growth differential is significant (HAP), then a 2.9% differential is <i>massive</i> (2010 RR), compounding the scale of their error.<p>After all, their original 2010 work implied a mean 2.9% drop in the growth rate once debt climbed above 90%. That paints a significantly different picture than a decrease of 1 percentage point, resulting net positive growth rate (2.2%) as opposed to negative (-0.1%).<p>While this is speculative on my part, I feel it's safe to say that had they originally reported these (allegedly) "very similar" numbers ( > 2% vs -0.1 %), their findings would not have gotten the same wide circulation in certain political circles that it did. Given that context, the whole "<i>...but the numbers are kinda close...</i>" argument falls a little flat IMHO.