Another alternative explanation: Female directors disrupt the existing, and lazier, board atmosphere with their better attendance records and stricter monitoring. Social friction, or even a low level power struggle emerges, in the worst cases, directing attention from other directors toward the immediacy of the contentious social situation on the board, in the worst cases fueled by sexism, but possibly just fueled by cultural differences.<p>(An older version of) the actual study is here:<p><a href="http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/15730/1/WP2008-7a.pdf" rel="nofollow">http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/15730/1/...</a><p>The abstract is:<p>Although some argue that tokenism drives the selection of female directors, we show that they have a significant impact on measures of board effectiveness. In a large panel of data on publicly-traded firms from 1996-2003, we find that (1) the likelihood that a female director has attendance problems is 0.29 lower than for a male director, (2) male directors have fewer attendance problems the greater the fraction of female directors on the board, (3) firms with more diverse boards provide their directors with more pay-performance incentives, and (4) firms with more diverse boards have more board meetings.<p>We also show that the positive relationship between corporate performance measures and gender diversity documented by previous studies is not robust to attempts to address the endogeneity of diversity. Instead, the average effect of gender diversity on both market valuation and operating performance appears to be negative. This negative effect is driven by companies with greater shareholder rights. <i>In firms with weaker shareholder rights, gender diversity has positive effects.</i> Our results suggest that diverse boards are tougher monitors. Nevertheless, mandating gender quotas in the boardroom may not increase board effectiveness on average, but may reduce it for well-governed firms where additional monitoring is counterproductive.<p>The fact that diverse boards perform better than homogeneous boards where shareholder rights are weaker seems consistent with the hypothesis that the diminished performance of women directors is stress and contention based: perhaps the tensions between the male and female members of the board, the CEO, and the shareholders, are more difficult to work within than if the board needn't bow to the shareholders as much.