Sensationalist, neuroscience vs. philosophy drivel from the author. There's nothing extreme about reductionist physical determinism in philosophy of mind literature. This methodology, besides being grossly inadequate at the experimental goals as portrayed in the article, doesn't add substantial evidence to the philosophical debate. Supervenience, epiphenomenalism, etc., all allow for fully deterministic physics of mind with various mechanisms of free will available (even if only as an explanatory agent in some). And I say this as someone who shares a similar metaphysical outlook as Kreiman.<p>Luckily Kreiman's work isn't about free will, but neural mechanisms of decision making. And it's quite interesting in that context. He (and Bok and Boyden) say as much in the article, but for some reason scientific journalism has to create equivocal contexts for everything because they're convinced whatever they're reporting on isn't interesting enough for what it is. And apparently it works, because it ends up here.