Are there distributed data stores like this that are also resilient to intentional sabotage?<p>I've been looking recently at long-term digital preservation systems -- tools designed to archive large amounts of data for decades. This is the Library of Alexandria problem -- how do we preserve all this data we're generating against once-in-a-century disasters?<p>So this 2005 paper lists thirteen different threats to long-term archives: Media Failure; Hardware Failure; Software Failure; Communication Errors; Failure of Network Services; Media & Hardware Obsolescence; Software Obsolescence; Operator Error; Natural Disaster; External Attack; Internal Attack; Economic Failure; Organizational Failure.[1]<p>Fault-tolerant distributed data stores are exciting, because they solve a bunch of those problems off the bat -- media failure, hardware failure, communication errors, failure of network services, hardware obsolescence, and natural disaster.<p>They also help to address software failure, software obsolescence, and economic failure, because archival projects are always strapped for resources and it's great to rely on tools that exist for totally distinct, commercially-valuable reasons.<p>But that still leaves operator error, external attack, and internal attack -- burning down the Library.<p>Hence my original question: are there distributed data stores that can be configured to resist intentional destruction of data?<p>[1] <a href="http://www.dlib.org/dlib/november05/rosenthal/11rosenthal.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.dlib.org/dlib/november05/rosenthal/11rosenthal.ht...</a>