The optics of this advisory are bad, of course, but these are probably not operationally important bugs for most people:<p>* DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record (<i>only impacts people who use DTLS, and is a null pointer deref, which usually isn't exploitable</i>)<p>* DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record (<i>same, and only exhausts memory</i>)<p>* no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL (<i>a non-standard build produces a null pointer crash in SSL3 negotiation</i>)<p>* ECDHE silently downgrades to ECDH (<i>this looks like a server can in an oddball situation lie about forward secrecy --- also, this only impacts OpenSSL clients, like curl</i>)<p>* RSA silently downgrades to EXPORT_RSA (<i>a server can sabotage the security of a session, which it can do in a variety of other ways anyways --- also, this only impacts OpenSSL clients, like curl</i>)<p>* DH client certificates accepted without verification (<i>breaks client authentication, which not many people rely on, but only affects servers that (a) do TLS client auth and (b) trust DH-key-issuing CAs, which are "extremely rare and hardly ever encountered"</i>)<p>* Certificate fingerprints can be modified (<i>this one I actually wonder about the sev:lo on; it's low because it doesn't impact browsers, but certificate blacklists are common in enterprise software</i>)<p>* Bignum squaring may produce incorrect results (<i>this is just weird</i>)