I'm interested to learn about the case law about this as it pertains to the constitutionality of disallowing a religious exemption.<p>Some common vaccines are derived from human fetal cell lines, and those fetal cell lines are themselves derived from a handful of elective abortions. For many of those vaccines, there are alternatives that are not derived from human fetal cell lines, but not all.<p>Several religious denominations that oppose abortion, e.g. the Catholic Church, have addressed this issue and said that such vaccines can and should be used, so long as there is no reasonable alternative and there is a proportionate reason. (The Church's reasoning, in case you're curious, is that the vaccines' connection to abortion is considered remote cooperation.)<p>But even though some denominations see the vaccines as permissible, I suppose it might be possible for a person, motivated by religious belief, to be completely on board with the efficacy of the vaccine but oppose how it was created on moral grounds, and so demand a religious exemption.<p>Typically in the U.S., religious beliefs must be reasonably accommodated. I would think that someone who objects to the vaccine mandate on religious grounds could make the argument that if it is possible for <i>anyone</i> to be accommodated (in this case, those with medical issues), then accommodation itself should be considered reasonable, and it's just a matter of determining whether accommodating both is so risky as to be unreasonable.<p>In other words, if we're willing to assume X amount of risk by allowing medical exemptions, then it follows that at least <i>some</i> risk can be tolerated. And if a religious objector can show that additionally assuming Y risk by allowing religious objections is not substantially more risky, then I think they could make the case that it should be considered reasonable to also accommodate religious beliefs.