This is appalling:<p><pre><code> Toyota had more than 10,000 global variables.
“And in practice, five, ten, okay, fine. 10,000, no, we're done.
It is not safe, and I don't need to see all 10,000 global
variables to know that that is a problem,” Koopman testified.
</code></pre>
and:<p><pre><code> Toyota’s failure to check the source code of its second CPU,
supplied by Denso —even as executives assured Congress and
NHTSA that the cause of UA couldn’t be in the engine software
</code></pre>
and:<p><pre><code> He was critical of Toyota watchdog supervisor – software to
detect the death of a task -- design. He testified that Toyota’s
watchdog supervisor “is incapable of ever detecting the death
of a major task. That's its whole job. It doesn't do it.
Instead, Toyota designed it to monitor CPU overload, and,
Barr testified: “it doesn't even do that right.
</code></pre>
and:<p><pre><code> Barr also testified that Toyota’s software threw away error codes
from the operating system, ignoring codes identifying a problem with
a task.
</code></pre>
When the news first broke a few years ago, given Toyota's reputation for quality and process, I thought this was an American industry lead witch-hunt of a Japanese competitor. But if this testimony is correct, what Toyota engineers have done is unforgivable.