The full transcripts were posted on the nasa spaceflight forum here: <a href="http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=35974.440" rel="nofollow">http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=35974.440</a>. One user provided the following summary:<p>> There was corporate conversational knowledge that unlocking the feather system during the transonic region would be catastrophic, but this knowledge wasn't formalized into the pilot handbook or in training. There was formal knowledge that unlocking late would lead to a flight abort, and a recent event had occurred where the unlock was late. Add to this copilot workload increases between flights, the fact that training wasn't done in the suits and equipment worn on the real flight or under the g and vibration loads in the flight, and the result was the copilot unlocked the feather early leading to the loss of the vehicle. As usual, not a single failure, but a chain of smaller failures - lack of formalization of knowledge, lack of training in the operational environment, recent events, pressure to avoid an abort, and you get an overcompensation.